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Can There Be Too Much 
Human Capital?
Is There a World Population Problem?
D. Gale Johnson 
University of Chicago
Most of the emphasis in the study of human capital is on investment 
in people and the consequences of that investment social and private 
returns, social and private costs, the effects of human capital upon pro 
ductivity and national output growth, on-the-job training versus formal 
education, and the substitution between quality and numbers of chil 
dren. I plan to discuss a rather different aspect of human capital, 
namely, the value of a person a human being with little or no for 
mal investment other than that common in the majority of the develop 
ing countries of the world.
My interest in the value of a person whose primary human capital 
consists of a combination of physical capability, native intelligence, 
and a limited education investment is in exploring whether population 
growth has a measurable negative effect upon real per capita income in 
developing countries. As I use the term, a negative effect exists if the 
total marginal product of an additional individual is less than the aver 
age product of the existing population. This definition of a negative 
effect does not require that the marginal product be negative, only that 
it be less than the average product or per capita income level. This is a 
very stringent test, much stronger than what is generally considered.
I believe if the majority of people were asked what was the relation 
ship between population growth and per capita real incomes in devel 
oping countries they would answer that there was a negative 
relationship that population growth reduces real per capita incomes 
below what they would otherwise be. This was the common viewpoint 
expressed in the popular press prior to and during the 1992 world con 
ference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro. It is the intent of the
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Population Crisis Committee, certain agencies of the United Nations, 
and the authors of The Population Bomb to create such an impression. 
It is certainly the answer given by officials in the People's Republic of 
China responsible for the country's population programs.
There have been relatively few voices putting forward a contrary 
view; Julian Simon has been the most prominent. A few years ago 
(1986) a Working Group was organized by the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, and after many meet 
ings and several studies commissioned, it issued a report (NRC 1986), 
Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions, 
which has been ignored except for reviews in a few scholarly journals. 
I hope I will be forgiven if a significant part of this paper is devoted to 
presenting the major findings of that report which, I believe have stood 
the test of time very well. But I may be biased I was the co-chairman 
of the Working Group.
Why is Population Growth Bad?
It is useful to start with the arguments that support the view that 
population growth has adverse effects upon economic growth in devel 
oping countries. The case is quite simple and straightforward. The 
earth is considered to be finite in terms of physical space and 
resources. The exploitation or use of its resources is subject to dimin 
ishing returns additional inputs (including labor) applied to the land, 
water, minerals, and forests will yield a diminished return. Therefore, 
other things equal, more people will mean a reduction in the marginal 
productivity of labor and, eventually, lower per capita incomes. These 
relationships seem so obvious that they are seldom spelled out so 
explicitly. The basic argument hasn't changed from that given by 
Malthus nearly two centuries ago.
The fact that only a small minority of the world's population eats 
less well today than did the majority of Europeans at the time Malthus 
wrote seems not to have dimmed the attractiveness of his model of 
human behavior (Fogel 1992). It is estimated that in the period 1781- 
1790, daily per capita calorie consumption in France was 1,753. As of 
1965, how many countries in the world had a smaller caloric supply?
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The answer is: exactly two Mozambique and Somalia (World Bank 
1992). It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that 
France's calorie consumption equaled that of India today. At the end of 
the eighteenth century England's daily per capita production of calo 
ries was 10 percent below the Indian daily consumption in 1989. It is 
sad to note that in 1989 there were three countries, all torn by war and 
revolution, that had less than 1,753 calories per day Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, and Chad and as of 1992 they have probably been joined 
by Somalia and Sudan. Yet the view that increased food supplies would 
soon be followed by increased mouths to feed should not be too sur 
prising, since this view was expressed more than two millennia ago in 
Ecclesiastes 5.11: "When goods are increased, they are increased that 
eat them."
The World Bank's World Development Report 1984 dealt with the 
issue of population change and development. The discussion, which is 
both competent and balanced, gave rather little weight to the impor 
tance of diminishing returns to or scarcity of resources except for the 
possible adverse effects of population growth on the environment. Nor 
was the claim made that rapid population growth stopped development 
or caused a fall in real per capita income. Instead, the consequences 
were that rapid population growth, such as that occurring in most 
developing countries, slowed economic development (p. 105). It 
attributes the negative effects of rapid population growth to two fac 
tors. The first was internal to the family; a large family reduces the 
investment in each child in terms of time and other resources. Since 
poor families have the most children, this makes it more difficult to 
reduce poverty. The second factor was that "rapid population growth 
weakens macroeconomic performance by making it more difficult to 
finance the investments in education and infrastructure that ensure sus 
tained economic growth" (p. 105). This work represented an important 
shift in the scholarly discussion of population growth, but seems not to 
have penetrated the popular discussion.
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What Are the Facts?
What are the facts concerning the relationship between population 
growth and development as measured by the growth in real per capita 
incomes? This may seem like a simple question and, at one level, it is. 
But as will become clear, it is far from a simple question. Or it may be 
a simple question with a complex answer or answers.
I shall present some empirical information concerning the relation 
ships between population growth and economic development. Let me 
note in advance that the empirical relationships presented do not prove 
causality; they do not prove that population growth has either a posi 
tive or negative effect upon development and growth. For this reason 
the Working Group (NRC 1986) did not present any regressions relat 
ing population growth to various variables, such as per capita income 
growth. Spurious correlations abound. Why do I present such data 
then? I do so because those who believe that population growth is the 
source of most human ills either implicitly or explicitly claim that a 
negative relationship holds between population growth and economic 
and social development. A recent pamphlet of the Population Crisis 
Committee, The International Human Suffering Index, presents, in 
color no less, a comparison between an index which it calls the Human 
Suffering Index and the annual rate of population increase. Two state 
ments are made: "Most countries with high human suffering scores 
have very high rates of population growth," and "Virtually all the 
countries with low human suffering scores have low rates of popula 
tion growth." But there appears to be a very weak statistical relation 
ship between the two variables except between the 57 countries 
classified as having Minimal and Moderate Human Suffering versus 
the 83 others. Within the 83 other countries, whose fates include those 
classified as subject to Extreme Human Suffering, there was almost no 
relationship between population growth and the index; the square of 
the correlation coefficient is 0.06. This means that 94 percent of the 
variation in the suffering index was due to something other than differ 
ences in population growth rates. If one's only source of information 
on the status of the life of people in developing countries were the dis 
cussion of the Human Suffering Index, one would hardly guess that life 
expectancy at birth has increased from no more than 35 years in 1950
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to 62 years in 1990 in the low-income countries (less than $600 GNP 
per capita in 1990).
Why It Is So Hard To Know
Why is it so hard to determine how population growth affects eco 
nomic development? As noted, the interrelationships between popula 
tion and economic growth are very complex. First, if economic 
development is measured by changes in per capita real income, at cer 
tain income levels increases in per capita income will result in an 
increase in population growth through influences that reduce mortality, 
especially infant mortality. For the developing economies, there is a 
strong negative relationship between income levels and infant mortal 
ity. Thus, if income and population growth are compared for the same 
time period, it is likely that there will be a positive relationship 
between the two. Introducing lags as I have may not entirely eliminate 
the problems associated with the direction of causality. Second, the 
effects of population growth can differ in the short and long run, with 
the short run being perhaps as long as half a century. Other things 
equal, in the short run an increase in population growth would be 
expected to lower the rate of growth in real per capita incomes. An 
increase in population growth rates will be accompanied by an increase 
in the number of children and in the dependency ratio. The labor force 
declines as a percentage of the population. In the long run the effects of 
investment in human capital can be realized. Positive effects through 
invention and innovation and increasing returns to scale can result 
from population growth when there is time for adjustment and 
response to changing conditions. Slow or nil long-run increases in pop 
ulation also increase dependency as the population ages. Thus, in the 
long run (after one or two generations), slow population growth can 
have similar effects upon per capita productivity as rapid population 
growth may have in the short run.
A possible reason for the belief that an increase in population in the 
developing countries will either lower the actual average income or the 
rate of growth of income is the implicit assumption that individuals in 
these countries consume everything they produce. This assumption is
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incorrect. The people of the developing countries do not consume 
everything they produce. According to World Bank data (1992, pp. 
234-235), the domestic savings rates of the low-income countries are 
equal to or greater than the rates for either middle- or high-income 
countries. Thus if resources are productively invested, over a lifetime 
an additional person would make possible an increase in the productive 
potential of a country. This conclusion assumes that savings rates are 
independent of population growth rates, and that point is addressed 
below. It may be noted that the savings estimate excludes savings that 
result in human capital investment. If the succeeding generation has 
more education and more adequate health care than the current genera 
tion has, this increases the probability that a significant positive rate of 
population growth either will have a positive or nil effect on per capita 
real incomes in the long run. Consequently, in considering the effect of 
population growth on income growth we must consider the total effect 
and not solely the marginal product of labor. This is why I earlier used 
the term "total marginal product" of an additional person which 
includes not only the marginal product of labor but the increase in 
investment and any effects through increasing returns to scale.
Some Empirical Relationships
There are a number of empirical relationships or propositions that 
merit our attention. The first two are of a very general nature, and the 
third involves regressions between population growth rates and real 
per capita incomes with the inclusion of other relevant variables. These 
empirical propositions raise some questions concerning the validity of 
the commonly held view that higher rates of population growth have 
adverse effects upon economic well-being. I do not claim that these 
empirical relationships imply causality, but only that each is worth 
pondering and exploring.
The first of the empirical relationships is that the significant 
increases in the real incomes in the industrial countries of Europe and 
North America occurred in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twen 
tieth centuries during a period of historically rapid population growth 
that followed a long period of slow population growth. From 1650 to
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1750 population growth rates were very low in both the industrial and 
developing regions at 0.33 and 0.34 percent annually (see table 1). At 
these rates population doubling would require two centuries. From 
1750 to 1900 population growth rates were higher in the industrial than 
in the developing regions and this difference continued through the 
first two decades of this century.
Table 1. Population Growth Rates and Distribution of World Population 
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SOURCES Bogue (1969, p. 49), United Nations (1988)
As late as 1840 life expectancy at birth in six European countries 
and Massachusetts was 41 years (table 2). It reached 50.5 years by 
1900 and then increased rapidly reaching 71 years by 1955. While we 
have little knowledge of life expectancy at birth in the developing 
regions prior to 1950, it is unlikely that there was any significant 
improvement in the prior century. However, since 1950 the increase in 
life expectancy can only be described as spectacular, increasing from 
35 years in 1950 to 62 years in 1990 (World Bank 1984 and 1992). Life 
expectancy at birth in the United States was approximately 42 years in 
1880; it did not reach 60 years until 1930. Thus, the lowest income
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countries in the world achieved a greater increase in life expectancy in 
25 years than was achieved in the United States in twice that long. This 
improvement in the developing regions was achieved during a period 
of rapid population growth.
Table 2. Expectation of Life at Birth for Six European Countries and 
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Similar rapid progress has been made in the developing world in 
reducing infant mortality and child death rates since 1950 (table 3). 
The infant mortality rate declined from 165 in 1950 to 72 in 1985, 
while the child death rate fell from 27 to 11; both are rates per 1,000. 
The infant mortality rate in the United States in 1900 was 160, and it 
declined to approximately 80 over the next quarter century (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1971, p. 55).
The second of the empirical propositions is that the developing 
countries had rapid economic growth in the three decades from 1950 to 
1980 with population growth rates exceeding those ever realized in the 
industrial countries. Population growth rates were 2 percent or more 
while the per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.6 percent during 
the three decades (National Research Council 1986, p. 5). Prior to 
1950 population growth rates had been much lower, generally 1 per-
Table 3. Life Expectancy at Birth, Infant Mortality Rate, and Child Death Rate
Life expectancy at birth 
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SOURCE: World Bank (1987).
a Income designations are based on per capita income (in 1985 U.S. dollars), low income, $390 or less, lower-middle income, $400-$ 1,600; upper-mid 
dle income, $1,600-$7,420 
b Rates are per 1,000 
c Data for Africa are for 1982.
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cent or less, and there had been slow or nil increases in real per capita 
incomes.
Economic growth was relatively slow during the 1950s in the low- 
income countries. If we look at a somewhat later period, 1965 to 1985, 
the rate of income growth was quite spectacular. The per capita gross 
national product for the low-income countries grew 2.9 percent annu 
ally for 1965-85 and exceeded the 2.4 percent of the industrial econo 
mies (World Bank 1987). Since low-income countries were defined as 
those with less than $400 per capita GNP in 1985, some rapidly grow 
ing countries that were poor in 1965 were excluded from the calcula 
tion because they grew out of the low-income category by 1985; had 
these countries been included, the growth of income would have been 
even higher.
The third of the empirical propositions is that the evidence does not 
support the view that for developing countries the rate of population 
growth has a negative effect upon per capita income growth for the 
period since 1950. Some results are given in table 4 for three decades. 
In the simple model it was assumed that per capita income growth in a 
decade was a function of population growth and per capita income 
growth in the prior decade. Enrollment ratios for primary schools and 
per capita gross domestic products were included. School enrollment is 
included to provide a rough indication of society's investment in 
human capital. Per capita GDP is included to determine if there is a 
convergence effect among the developing countries. Per capita GDP 
growth in the prior decade was included because of the possible cau 
sality between income growth and population growth and the possibil 
ity of continuity in per capita income growth from one decade to the 
next. The coefficient for population growth was positive but not signif 
icantly different from zero for each of the three decades for low- 
income countries. For middle-income countries the coefficient was 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level 
for the 1960s, but was not significant for either of the other two 
decades. Thus, of the six coefficients for the developing countries, only 
one indicated that there was a (weak) negative relationship between 
past population growth and current growth of GDP per capita. The 
variables included had surprisingly little relationship to the real per 
capita growth rates. The correlation coefficients were very small and 
none of the coefficients were statistically significant at the conven-
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tional 5 percent level. Obviously other variables, including policy vari 
ables, are much more important in influencing income growth rates 
than population growth or the human capital measures that I have 
included.


































































NOTES GDP data are from Summers and Heston (1991); and World Bank (various years) 
Lagged population and lagged GDP growth rates are for the pnor decade, lagged GDP level is 
beginning year of the decade Africa and Latin America dummies are 1 for country in region, 0 
otherwise Constant terms not presented
*Statistically significant at 5 percent level
**Statistically significant at 10 percent level
Table 5 is from Levine and Renelt (1992), who included population 
growth as one of the variables in their analysis of the influence of pol 
icy factors on economic growth in 119 countries. In none of the regres 
sions was there a statistically significant effect of population growth on 
the rate of economic growth. Several of the policy or policy-related 
variables had a statistically significant coefficient, especially invest 
ment and government share. A study by Singh (1992) for twenty-nine 
developing economies obtained negative but insignificant coefficients
Table 5. Cross-Country Growth Regressions (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP)
Independent variable
Constant
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Growth of domestic credit (GDC)
























































SOURCE: Levme and Renelt (1992)
NOTES Regressions (1), (3), and (4) use primarily World Bank and IMF data, while regressions (2) and (5) use Summers and Heston data Coverage
includes all countnes with data given by the sources except major oil exporters
*Statistically significant at the P=0.05 level
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for the population growth variable. In each of these studies the periods 
for income and population growth were contemporaneous.
Population Growth Only One Factor
Before summarizing the results of the NRC study on population 
growth and economic development, I want to make a point that is all 
too often ignored in the popular discussions of the subject. Population 
growth is only one factor in determining the economic well-being of 
the citizens of a country. And, looking around the world today at the 
observed differences in real per capita incomes, it seems to be a rather 
minor factor in explaining such differences. Governmental policies are 
of far greater importance. Much of the human suffering witnessed in 
recent years has not been caused by excessive population growth or too 
large populations; most of the real causes are to be found in civil war 
and strife and governmental mismanagement and failures. Bangladesh 
is a probable exception to this conclusion, but I am not sure that there 
are any others.
China is a clear example of the dominance of factors other than pop 
ulation growth in explaining real income growth over the past four 
decades. While there has been a reduction in population growth rates 
over the past three decades, the small decline in the population growth 
rate after the early 1970s can't account for any significant part of the 
sharp changes in the growth of income per capita. Using the Summers 
and Heston (1991) estimates, per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 
2.3 percent from 1960-1973, by 3.7 percent from 1973-1980 and, dur 
ing major policy reforms, 7.8 percent from 1980 to 1988. Population 
growth rates in Taiwan closely parallel those of the mainland, but from 
1960 to 1980 the real income growth rate was double that of the main 
land. This difference can only be explained by policy factors. From 
1980-1988 the per capita income growth rate on the mainland 
exceeded that of Taiwan.
Most African countries, unfortunately, provide further evidence of 
how the national policy framework dominates changes in economic 
welfare. From 1973-1980, thirty out of forty-six African countries had 
negative real per capita income growth rates (Summers and Heston
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1991). The same number had negative per capita growth rates during 
1980-1988. During these two periods the African countries generally 
followed import substitution policies with heavy taxation of agricul 
ture, especially of export commodities. The beginning of the shift to 
market-oriented policies did not begin generally until the mid-1980s 
and is just now beginning to influence the pattern of growth.
Propositions: Population and Growth
In the report, Population Growth and Economic Development'. Pol 
icy Questions (NRC 1986), nine questions were posed and the avail 
able evidence was used to answer them. I shall now paraphrase the 
nine questions and provide a brief summary of the report's conclu 
sions.
1. Would slower population growth increase the per capita supply of 
exhaustible resources?
In reflecting upon this question, it should be remembered that over 
the past century the real prices of exhaustible natural resources have 
declined, not increased (Simon 1981). The decline in the prices of such 
resources relative to wages or earnings has been striking; for oil and 
coal the time cost today is about a fifth of what it was a century ago. 
The same pattern of decline in relative scarcity has prevailed for non- 
fuel resources such as copper.
An important point is that no exhaustible resource is essential or 
irreplaceable. As the easily available supplies of such a resource are 
extracted, the real cost of extraction and the price increase, which 
encourages economy in the use of that resource and stimulate the 
search for substitutes. One reason that real copper prices have declined 
is that aluminum, which is derived from a plentiful resource (bauxite), 
has been substituted for it in many uses, especially wire.
A little reflection will convince you that the number of people who 
will enjoy the use of an exhaustible resource will be the same whether 
population growth is slow or fast. Exhaustion will occur sooner with 
rapid population growth than with slow population growth, but the 
number of people who will have used the resource will be the same. If 
you contend that with more time provided by slower population
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growth it would be possible to learn how to economize on the use of 
the resource, you have already lost most of your argument that rapid 
population growth results in undue resource exhaustion. The applica 
tion of more resources to find ways to economize on use of the 
exhaustible resource is an effective substitute for more time. With a 
larger population there are more human resources to devote to the 
problem at an earlier time.
2. Would slower population growth increase the per capita availabil 
ity of renewable resources and thus increase per capita income?
Up to the present, the decline in the per capita availability of renew 
able resources, such as land, has not resulted in a reduction in per cap 
ita income. Instead, the long-run trend in the prices of farm products 
that depend upon land, especially the food crops, has been a declining 
one over the past century (Simon 1981).
We need to bear in mind that the use of renewable resources is influ 
enced by existing institutional arrangements. Some institutional 
arrangements, such as common property or property rights, that are 
limited and uncertain may have disastrous effects upon the conserva 
tion of renewable resources. Consider the near extinction of certain 
kinds of whales or the depletion of certain fishing areas. These 
occurred where common property existed and, until recently, no effec 
tive mechanism existed for avoiding the "tragedy of the commons." 
The tragedy of the commons occurs because it is in the interest of the 
individual to use or harvest the commons as long as what is harvested 
has a value greater than the costs, even though this activity reduces the 
total output. Consequently, if serious problems do occur due to the 
diminution of the productivity of renewable resources, it will probably 
be because appropriate institutional arrangements do not exist.
3. Will slower population growth alleviate pollution and environ 
mental degradation?
Environmental resources, such as air and water, are almost always 
common property; unless appropriate institutional arrangements exist, 
these resources will be overused whether population is growing rap 
idly, slowly, or not at all. There is an optimum level of pollution, 
namely, the level at which the marginal cost of reducing the pollution 
equals the value of the marginal harm done by the pollutant. But where 
air or water are common property, no enterprise or person has to bear 
more than a small part of the cost of pollution created. Public policy
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has the responsibility of internalizing the cost of pollution by adopting 
measures, such as regulations, fees, or incentives for pollution abate 
ment, that force or induce producers to limit the amount of pollution to 
the socially optimum level. Please note that enterprise is used here in a 
very broad sense and includes enterprises owned publicly, such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority or the local school district, as well as those 
owned privately; no form of ownership has a monopoly on pollution.
Major sources of pollution in the world today, however, are not 
associated with rapidly growing populations but with either popula 
tions with high incomes or in countries that had socialist economic sys 
tems. Feshback and Friendly (1992) chronicle the story of how having 
the means of production "owned by all the people" led to environmen 
tal disaster in the Soviet Union. People with high incomes consume 
more than people with low incomes, and their demands upon produc 
tion resources and the potential for environmental disruption are 
greater. It follows that if population growth has little or no effect on 
income growth, more people increase the potential for environmental 
disruption; but the actual amount of environmental disruption is a 
function of many variables other than either per capita incomes or pop 
ulation.
Based on research done since 1986, it is now possible to say more 
about the effects of developing country economic growth on the state 
of the environment. A major factor in economic growth is the openness 
of the economy to the world economy the degree of trade liberaliza 
tion. Because of the comments about the North American Free Trade 
Agreement by groups that the press calls environmentalists, I start by 
noting the probable effects of world trade liberalization upon the envi 
ronment. This is a topic ably addressed in a recent paper by Kym 
Anderson (1992).
The probable direct effect of world trade liberalization would be to 
reduce pollution overall. Two effects are worthy of note. Agriculture is 
an important source of ground water pollution, especially in the indus 
trial countries. This is due to the relatively heavy use of chemicals in 
crop production and the concentration of livestock production in large 
units. Trade liberalization for farm products would shift crop produc 
tion from countries with high farm output prices and heavy chemical 
use to countries that have and would continue to have lower levels of 
fertilizer and pesticide use. If there were worldwide trade liberalization
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in agricultural products, grain production would shift from Western 
Europe to Argentina, Australia, Thailand, and the United States. With 
the lower crop prices in Western Europe, chemical use would be signif 
icantly reduced. While use of chemicals would increase some in the 
countries expanding-crop production, the use level would be relatively 
low due to the price relationships between crops and fertilizer. The 
expansion in U.S. crop production would result from the return of idled 
land to cultivation; chemical use would fall.
The second direct effect of trade liberalization relates to the use of 
energy. Most developing countries hold energy prices below world 
market prices, resulting in excessive use of energy per unit of output. 
In China and India coal prices have been kept at hardly more than half 
the world market prices. Not only is an excessive amount of coal and 
other energy used, but energy is used inefficiently because it has not 
paid to invest in new and less polluting combustion technology. Ineffi 
ciency in combustion leads to a high level of pollution per btu con 
sumed.
If the developing countries liberalize trade, including trade in 
energy, energy prices will rise to world market levels and there will be 
an incentive to conserve in the use of energy and thus reduce pollution.
One of the sources of environmental disruption in the low-income 
developing countries is the harvesting of forests for firewood and the 
consequent erosion and silting of rivers. As labor becomes more valu 
able, wood becomes less competitive as fuel. Its main cost under the 
conditions in the low-income developing countries is time, since the 
institutional arrangements permit harvesting without paying for the 
trees. Deforestation occurs not only because labor is so cheap, but 
because the rights to utilize the forest are not well defined.
The available evidence indicates that pollution abatement is a nor 
mal good. This means that the income elasticity of demand for pollu 
tion abatement is positive and that as real per capita incomes increase, 
people demand more pollution abatement. It is not only that more 
effort and resources are devoted to pollution abatement, but the accept 
able standards for pollution become more stringent. Consequently, it 
can be expected that as per capita incomes increase in the developing 
countries, less and less pollution will be acceptable and permitted. 
Restraints on pollution are a function of per capita incomes, population 
density, and urbanization.
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Those who opposed NAFTA because of presumed environmental 
effects apparently failed to consider such rational responses. Theirs is a 
highly condescending and even insulting view of the people of devel 
oping countries. The progress that developing countries have made in 
environmental improvement where it really counts, namely, in saving 
lives, has been enormous over the past four decades. Earlier I referred 
to the sharp reduction in infant mortality. A large share of this decline 
resulted from environmental improvements better handling of sew 
age and the provision of safer and cleaner water. These changes 
occurred because the people of the developing countries had more 
income and allocated increased resources to improving their environ 
ment. And the evidence is clear: they have been highly successful at 
improving the environment where it really counts in saving lives and 
reducing illness.
4. Will slower population growth lead to more capital per worker 
and higher per capita worker output and income?
Does slower population growth increase the rate of saving? The 
NRC (1986) Working Group, after reviewing various ways in which 
population growth could influence the savings rate, concluded: "We 
have found little evidence that the aggregate savings rate depends on 
growth rates or the age structure of the population" (p. 87). Subse 
quently, A.C. Kelley (1988) presented the results of his research on the 
effect of population growth on savings and investments in developing 
countries. He considered three possible reasons for negative effects 
upon economic growth: age dependency, capital shallowing, and 
investment diversion. The age dependency effect is due to the large 
proportion of children who do not work; the children may also be 
responsible for investment diversion to consumption. Capital shallow 
ing is nothing more than a reduction in the amount of capital per 
worker if savings decline on a per capita basis. Kelley concluded that 
the empirical research had not substantiated any of these effects (p. 
459). He also noted that where the economic analysis was rather more 
sophisticated and included second order effects such as economizing 
on resources and supply effects, the "puzzle of reconciling the apparent 
divergencies between theory and fact disappears" (p. 460).
5. Do lower population densities cause lower per capita incomes by 
reduced stimulus to innovation and reduced economies of scale?
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One of Adam Smith's greatest contributions to economics was his 
analysis of the interrelationships between specialization, the extent of 
the market, and the existence of economies of scale. The NRC Work 
ing Group concluded that for manufacturing, the economies of scale 
can be achieved at an unspecified moderate-sized city. The liberaliza 
tion of international trade in agricultural products and the international 
flow of capital and technology probably does mean that low rates of 
population growth are without significant effect upon innovation in 
manufacturing productivity. And the same answer seems to apply if the 
question is put differently: Does rapid population growth reduce the 
growth of labor productivity in manufacturing? The answer also seems 
to be in the negative.
The Working Group concluded that low density of population could 
and probably did have adverse effects upon productivity in agriculture. 
This effect resulted from the costs of the infrastructure, such as roads, 
communication, marketing services, agricultural research and exten 
sion. While Boserup (1981) showed how increased population density 
influenced the intensity of cultivation and encouraged technological 
change, it cannot be ruled out that after a certain density of agricultural 
population is reached, the productivity effects of increased density are 
either nil or negative. This still seems to be an open question.
6. Will slower population growth increase per capita levels of 
schooling and health?
This question needs to be considered in two parts. The first is the 
effect of an increase in the average number of children in a family 
upon family expenditures on education and schooling. The evidence 
supports the conclusion that having more children reduces the amount 
spent on each child.
The second part is the response of the public sectors to an increase 
in the number of children. T.P. Schultz (1987) found that the percent 
age of school-age children enrolled in school was not associated with 
the size of the school-age population relative to the total population. 
He found, however, that expenditures per child were a negative func 
tion of the relative size of the school-age population. These results are 
quite striking; they indicate that during recent years of rapidly growing 
populations in developing countries, these countries were able to 
increase the places in school rapidly enough to keep pace. In fact, in 
almost all developing countries the percentage of school-age children
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in school has increased. Increasing the number of places, unfortu 
nately, was apparently associated with little increase in total expendi 
tures on education as the percentage of the population in school 
increased.
The Working Group could not isolate any effects of population 
growth on health expenditures due to the poor quality of the available 
data.
7. Will slower population growth decrease the degree of income ine 
quality?
In the short run the effects of slower population growth on income 
inequality depend on the distribution of the fertility decline among 
income groups. If the fertility decline occurs first in the higher income 
groups, the short-run effects will be to increase the inequality of the 
income distribution. If the fertility decline is greater in urban than in 
rural areas, there will be a short-run increase in income inequality, 
since urban incomes are significantly higher than rural incomes in 
developing countries
In the long run the effect of a decline in fertility on the distribution 
of income is likely to work through increasing the amount of capital 
per worker as the number of entrants to the labor force declines. This 
conclusion depends on the earlier conclusion that savings rates are 
independent of population growth or age composition. In effect, if 
labor becomes more scarce, it may command a higher share of the 
national product and in this way somewhat reduce the inequality in the 
distribution of income.
8. Will slower population growth facilitate the transfer of workers 
into the modern sector and alleviate problems of urban growth?
It cannot be doubted that rapid urbanization has occurred in the 
developing countries since 1950, nor can one doubt that the rapid 
growth was a response to population growth rates. Approximately 60 
percent of the increase in urban population has been due to natural 
population growth; the remainder has been due to migration from rural 
areas (NRC 1986, p. 67).
But once these facts are noted, it is important to recognize that part 
of the rapid growth of cities such as Mexico City and Cairo has been 
due to policies that subsidized living in cities, especially by providing 
large food subsidies that in most cases were not available to farmers. In 
addition, the income differences between urban and rural populations
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in developing countries have been very large, generally with urban per 
capita incomes ranging from 2.5 to 5 times rural incomes. Often the 
low rural incomes have reflected an urban bias, as well as the taxation 
of agriculture through low prices for farm products and high prices for 
farm inputs.
Consequently, governmental policies have had a role in rapid urban 
ization in the developing countries. If agriculture and rural areas were 
permitted to share more fully in economic growth, there would be less 
concern about too rapid urbanization. But economic growth does result 
in a shift of population from rural to urban areas, and this shift can be 
avoided only at large cost. Except to protect the relatively high 
incomes of those now in the cities, it is not obvious why there should 
be objection to the growth of urban populations.
9. Can a couple's fertility behavior impose costs on society at large?
The apparent answer is in the affirmative. Where there are public 
goods such as parks and roads, another child increases congestion. 
Given that most schools are publicly financed, an additional child 
imposes costs upon taxpayers generally. Furthermore, additional chil 
dren will in due course increase the number of workers and thus reduce 
wages, resulting in a potential increase in income inequality. This is 
essentially the answer in the NRC Working Group report.
It was an answer that I found unconvincing because it ignored the 
general thrust of the report, namely, that population growth had little or 
no effect on per capita income growth. True, some negative effects 
were noted, such as on the quality of education or at least on per capital 
education expenditures. But there were also some positive effects, such 
as economies of scale. On balance it seems to me that there is little evi 
dence to support the position that a family imposes net negative exter 
nalities upon society when it chooses to have another child. The family 
does impose certain costs upon others, but the most important of 
these the cost of schooling is a cost that most societies have chosen 
to bear publicly for the general benefits that a society derives from hav 
ing a well-educated population.
At least the Working Group came down against governmental coer 
cion to control fertility decisions, although it was unwilling to use the 
word coercion and instead said that it preferred using changes in incen 
tives rather than quantity rationing. Quantity rationing limiting the 
number of children a couple may have can only be imposed by the
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application of coercion. Finally, the following was stated: "It is impor 
tant to note, however, that current data and theory are inadequate to 
quantify the size of the external effects; certainly there is no evidence 
to suggest that drastic financial or legal restrictions on child bearing are 
warranted" (p. 84).
What is the Value of a Person?
The last of the questions concerning whether an added birth imposes 
costs upon society generally, is not quite the question that I posed at 
the beginning of this paper. The question I posed was whether adding 
to the population lowered the level of per capita income. Put another 
way, the question was whether in a developing country the total mar 
ginal product of a person of average human capital was below the aver 
age product of that economy. I interpret the evidence, including the 
research and conclusions of the Working Group, to support the conclu 
sion that the population growth rates that we have observed in recent 
decades have had little or no significant effect upon the level or the rate 
of growth of per capita income in either the long or the short run.
I wish to note two caveats to the conclusion that I have just stated. 
First, there are reasons to argue that moderate rates of population 
growth are more supportive of economic development than either low, 
including negative, or high rates. I define moderate rates of population 
growth in the approximate range of 1.25 to 2.5 percent. Population 
growth rates of 3 percent or more may reduce rates of per capita 
income growth primarily because of the stress placed upon institutions, 
such as education, health, and city governments, by the high rates of 
adjustment required. High rates of population growth may require rates 
of response that are beyond the capabilities of such institutions. Sec 
ond, even if population growth rates have no significant effects upon 
economic development, governments should pursue many ordinary 
economic and social programs, such as universal elementary educa 
tion, maternal and child health care, and institutions that assist individ 
uals in providing personal financial security, that have the effect of 
reducing the rates of population growth, although that is not the pri 
mary objective of such programs.
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A Positive Population Policy
I strongly support a positive population policy that seeks the objec 
tive of assisting every family in a country to have the number of chil 
dren that each family desires. By definition, such programs must be 
voluntary; coercion and compulsion are simply not consistent with 
each family achieving its objectives. Thus I strongly favor govern 
ments making both relevant information and contraceptive materials 
available to every family that desires such information and materials. 
As I argued above, a case has not been made that there is a significantly 
negative externality to the number of children a family has. But, 
because I believe that the welfare of families is enhanced if they are 
given the resources that they need to limit the number of children to the 
number each family desires, I believe that governments should accept 
the responsibility of assuring that such resources are available and their 
availability is highly publicized.
I would argue that governments should go well beyond what many 
would argue is a passive population policy such as I have described, 
though in most real world situations policy makers would not agree 
that such a policy can be carried out without addressing some real con 
flicts. While ruling out coercion, governments can and do influence the 
number of children a family desires as well as the number a family has. 
This can be done by influencing conditions that are recognized to have 
an effect upon the number of children desired. Education, especially of 
women, has major impacts on both the desired and the actual number 
of children. Creating conditions that reduce infant mortality leads to a 
reduction in the number of children born, though with a lag.
In many rural communities old-age security is achieved primarily 
through having several children, especially male children. In rural 
China, for example, the rural reforms have not produced any alterna 
tive sources of old-age security to having one or more sons. While the 
ownership of land is one means for providing security in one's older 
years, private ownership of farm land does not exist in China. Not only 
can rural families not own the land they farm, they cannot assume that 
the land use rights assigned to them can be readily marketed. There are 
other alternatives for making provision for the uncertainties of old age 
and death, such as life insurance and access to reliable savings institu 
tions that are allowed to have positive real interest rates. The most
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immediate and direct approach for the provision of old-age security in 
China would be the extension of the social security system to the entire 
population, rather than restricting it to the employees of the govern 
ment and state and some collective enterprises.
The cost of providing a pension to all rural residents 65 years and 
older at 80 percent of the average annual income of all rural residents 
would not be beyond the financial resources of the Chinese govern 
ment. In 1989 there were 56 million persons living outside of cities 
who were 65 years of age or older. If the average pension were 50 yuan 
per month, the annual cost would be 34 billion yuan. This is less than 
the budgetary cost of the grain price subsidy in 1991! This subsidy 
went to urban residents who, on average, had far higher incomes than 
rural people. It appears that the grain price subsidy is being phased out. 
It would be hard to think of any alternative use for those funds that 
would create greater happiness and contribute more to the future via 
bility and tranquility of the Chinese society than the creation of a uni 
versal social security system.
Such a system, especially if combined with providing the institu 
tional and legal framework for individuals to make some provision for 
their financial security, would achieve two major objectives. It would 
significantly alter the incentives to have large numbers of children, and 
it would reduce the neglect and mistreatment of female babies. Put 
more directly, much of the pressure in rural China for violating the 
restraints of the coercive population policy would be eliminated if rural 
families had viable alternatives to a son or sons to provide security for 
their old age.
Coercive population programs do great harm, not only to families 
but to a nation. Fortunately, policies and programs that will lead to 
reductions in population growth rates need not be coercive. The appro 
priate criteria for evaluating programs that directly influence the num 
ber of births is the degree to which families are assisted in having the 
number of children they desire. Lacking evidence that family decisions 
with respect to the number of children have adverse external effects 
upon others, there is no basis for coercive behavior by governments. 
Even if there were some adverse external effects, however, I would 
still hold that decisions with respect to the number of children should 
be made by the family. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who 
accepts the Western concept of human rights would approve of the use 
of coercive restraints placed on such a fundamental right.
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